VC-backed startups commit more fraud, and researchers think they know why
VC-backed startups commit more fraud, and researchers think they know why
风险投资支持的初创公司欺诈行为更多，研究人员认为他们找到了原因
A new report from the U.K.’s Imperial College and France’s Emlyon Business School has mapped out the ways Silicon Valley’s VC-backed founders commit fraud — and the role investors play. For the report, published online in June, researchers built a database of tech founders and companies who faced civil and criminal securities fraud prosecutions from the SEC and DOJ between 2000 and 2023. 英国帝国理工学院和法国里昂商学院的一份新报告梳理了硅谷风投支持的创始人进行欺诈的方式，以及投资者在其中扮演的角色。这份于六月在线发布的报告中，研究人员建立了一个数据库，收录了 2000 年至 2023 年间面临美国证券交易委员会（SEC）和司法部（DOJ）民事及刑事证券欺诈起诉的科技创始人和公司。
Some famous cases of tech founders being convicted of fraud over the past few years include Frank’s Charlie Javice, Kalder’s Gökçe Güven, Terraform Labs’ Do Kwon, and GameOn’s Alexander and Valerie Lau Beckman. All over X, the tech industry’s social network of choice, the topic of fraud and its gentler word “scam” are discussed, as people debate the limits of ambition and success. 过去几年中，一些科技创始人因欺诈被定罪的著名案例包括 Frank 的 Charlie Javice、Kalder 的 Gökçe Güven、Terraform Labs 的 Do Kwon 以及 GameOn 的 Alexander 和 Valerie Lau Beckman。在科技行业首选的社交网络 X 上，关于欺诈及其委婉说法“骗局”的话题随处可见，人们在讨论雄心与成功的界限。
“Fraud is much more common and normalized in the startup world than we are ready to admit and accept,” Tim Weiss, one of the authors of the report, told TechCrunch. He pointed to another report from the University of Toronto (UT), also published in June, that looked at 654 fraud cases against U.S. VC-backed startups from 2000 to 2023. It found that fraud is rare overall but that companies with venture funding were more likely to face fraud charges compared to companies that didn’t take venture funding. “在初创公司领域，欺诈行为比我们愿意承认和接受的要普遍得多，也更常态化，”该报告的作者之一 Tim Weiss 对 TechCrunch 表示。他提到了多伦多大学（UT）同样于六月发布的另一份报告，该报告调查了 2000 年至 2023 年间针对美国风投支持的初创公司的 654 起欺诈案件。研究发现，虽然欺诈总体上并不常见，但与未获得风投的公司相比，获得风投的公司面临欺诈指控的可能性更高。
It found that startups launched during overheated markets with weak oversight and investor due diligence are 19% more likely to later commit fraud. “The problem here is not just the founders but also those that set and reinforce, at times unreasonable, expectations of high growth,” Weiss said. He added that the current frothy AI startup environment is exactly the kind of conditions that tempt founders into fraud. 研究发现，在市场过热、监管和投资者尽职调查薄弱时期成立的初创公司，日后发生欺诈的可能性高出 19%。Weiss 说：“这里的问题不仅在于创始人，还在于那些设定并强化（有时是不合理的）高增长预期的人。”他补充道，当前泡沫化的 AI 初创公司环境正是诱使创始人进行欺诈的温床。
Weiss’ paper, co-authored with Emlyon researcher Nevena Radoynovska, discusses what may happen when founders face a gap between how investors want their startups to perform and how they are actually performing. They may turn to “façading,” as the paper calls it, in three increasingly dishonest stages: surface, reinforced, and deep. Weiss 与里昂商学院研究员 Nevena Radoynovska 合著的论文讨论了当创始人面临投资者期望的业绩与实际业绩之间的差距时会发生什么。正如论文所称，他们可能会转向“虚饰”（façading），这种行为分为三个不诚实程度递增的阶段：表面虚饰、强化虚饰和深度虚饰。
Surface façading is when founders lie about how successful the company is or is becoming. It’s common during the early stages of a company when it’s pitching its vision to investors. It’s a level of dishonesty higher than just pitching an aspirational vision or an astronomical total addressable market. After the surface façade, the founder may move into “reinforced façading,” according to the paper, which involves creating fake evidence to back up the lies told. 表面虚饰是指创始人谎报公司的成功程度或发展前景。这在公司早期向投资者推介愿景时很常见。这种不诚实程度高于仅仅推销宏伟愿景或天文数字般的潜在市场规模。据论文所述，在表面虚饰之后，创始人可能会进入“强化虚饰”阶段，即制造虚假证据来支撑所说的谎言。
The paper gave the example of a mobile testing app that created fake customer contracts and invoices, recorded fake revenue, and used those fake documents to convince VCs to back it at a unicorn valuation. From there founders may enter “deep façading,” where they extend their lies to areas like making their tech seem more capable than it is, complete with fake demos. This involves entire “parallel realities” built on lies, Weiss said. 论文举了一个移动测试应用的例子：该公司伪造了客户合同和发票，记录了虚假收入，并利用这些虚假文件说服风投以独角兽估值进行投资。此后，创始人可能会进入“深度虚饰”阶段，将谎言延伸到诸如夸大技术能力等领域，甚至制作虚假演示。Weiss 表示，这涉及建立在谎言之上的整个“平行现实”。
But investors aren’t always hapless victims, the researchers found. Beyond the outsized growth expectations that push founders toward fraud in the first place, some investors unwittingly “co-create fraud,” Weiss said, by continuing to back founders—sometimes the very same ones—who’ve previously been accused of fraud, thereby normalizing it to a certain extent. 但研究人员发现，投资者并不总是无辜的受害者。Weiss 指出，除了最初推动创始人走向欺诈的过高增长预期外，一些投资者还在无意中“共同制造了欺诈”，他们继续支持那些曾被指控欺诈的创始人（有时甚至是同一批人），从而在一定程度上使这种行为常态化。
In fact, the UT report found little evidence that alleged fraud prevents founders from raising funding for new startups, even when those fraud cases received major media attention. “New investors and the broader VC market do not penalize past misconduct,” the UT report said, which is “also consistent with the Silicon Valley culture that embraces failure regardless of the cause.” 事实上，多伦多大学的报告几乎没有发现证据表明涉嫌欺诈会阻碍创始人为新初创公司融资，即使这些欺诈案件曾受到媒体的广泛关注。报告称：“新投资者和更广泛的风投市场并不会惩罚过去的违规行为，这也与硅谷那种无论原因如何都拥抱失败的文化相一致。”
The study also found that startups whose boards were controlled by the founders were twice as likely to commit fraud compared to those with investor-controlled or shared-controlled boards. Even more interesting, it reported that after VC-backed startups go public, they are more likely to face securities class-action lawsuits within two years compared with private equity-backed companies that go public. 研究还发现，由创始人控制董事会的初创公司发生欺诈的可能性，是那些由投资者控制或共同控制董事会的公司的两倍。更有趣的是，报告指出，在风投支持的初创公司上市后，与私募股权支持的上市公司相比，它们在两年内面临证券集体诉讼的可能性更高。
The fact that companies are staying private longer also contributes. Public companies undergo more scrutiny than private ones. “Founders do not have a professional body or association that could govern or enforce rules of entrepreneurial and investor conduct on how to be a good founder and what reasonable growth expectations are,” Weiss said. 公司保持私有化时间更长也是一个因素。上市公司比私有公司受到更多的审查。Weiss 说：“创始人没有一个专业机构或协会来管理或执行关于如何成为一名好创始人以及什么是合理增长预期的创业和投资者行为准则。”
Weiss proposes that the SEC routinely investigate and conduct formal audits on startups after they hit a large “investment threshold.” Currently, the SEC typically waits for something like a whistleblower complaint or a lawsuit from investors or former employees to trigger an investigation. Weiss’ paper also suggests that investors should take more accountability when pushing founders to hit extreme growth metrics. Weiss 建议 SEC 在初创公司达到较大的“投资门槛”后，对其进行例行调查和正式审计。目前，SEC 通常要等到举报投诉或投资者/前员工提起诉讼后才会触发调查。Weiss 的论文还建议，投资者在推动创始人实现极端增长指标时，应承担更多责任。
“Investors should be held liable for corporate governance failures and violating their fiduciary duties,” he said. He wants to see more research into “entrepreneur-investor dynamics” that could help prevent fraud and also “balance the overemphasis on the entrepreneur as the sole perpetrator of wrongdoing.” Fraud is rarely a solo act, in other words, and until investors are held to account for the pressure they exert, founders will likely keep facing the temptation to fake it until they make it. “投资者应为公司治理失败和违反信托义务承担责任，”他说。他希望看到更多关于“创业者与投资者动态关系”的研究，这有助于预防欺诈，并“平衡那种过度强调创业者是唯一过错方的观点”。换句话说，欺诈很少是单人行为，除非投资者为他们施加的压力负责，否则创始人很可能会继续面临“假装成功直到真正成功”的诱惑。