Explainable AI for the EU Right to Explanation: A Systematic Review of the Law-XAI Translation Gap

可解释人工智能与欧盟“解释权”：法律与XAI转化鸿沟的系统性综述

Abstract: When algorithms make or influence consequential decisions—about loan eligibility, hiring, or healthcare—EU law grants affected individuals a Right to Explanation. Yet whether (and how) Explainable AI (XAI) can satisfy this right in practice remains poorly understood, with direct implications for individuals’ ability to contest automated decisions that affect their lives.

摘要： 当算法做出或影响重大决策（如贷款资格、招聘或医疗保健）时，欧盟法律赋予了受影响个人“解释权”。然而，可解释人工智能（XAI）在实践中是否（以及如何）能够满足这一权利，目前尚不明确，这直接影响到个人对影响其生活的自动化决策提出异议的能力。

This paper presents a systematic literature review of XAI in the context of the EU Right to Explanation, with particular focus on Art. 15(1)(h) GDPR, Art. 86 AI Act (AIA), and related instruments. We consider papers published from 2024 onwards, as the final version of the AIA was published in July 2024—with Art. 86 being added late.

本文对欧盟“解释权”背景下的XAI进行了系统性文献综述，重点关注《通用数据保护条例》（GDPR）第15(1)(h)条、《人工智能法案》（AIA）第86条及相关法律文书。我们考察了2024年及以后发表的论文，因为《人工智能法案》的最终版本于2024年7月发布，其中第86条是后期加入的。

From 2643 initial records identified by a deliberately broad search, we review 57 full texts, of which only 19 papers demonstrate substantive integration of both legal and technical perspectives, showing gaps in the interdisciplinary synthesis of the current regulatory framework.

通过广泛的初步检索，我们从2643条记录中筛选出57篇全文进行审阅。其中仅有19篇论文展示了法律与技术视角的实质性融合，这表明当前监管框架在跨学科综合方面仍存在差距。

We document three problematic patterns across the corpus: Most misidentify the GDPR legal basis; few engage with the CJEU’s Dun & Bradstreet judgment (likely due to publication timing); and the distinction between explanation form (governed by addressee) and content (governed by legal purpose) is often conflated.

我们记录了文献库中存在的三种问题模式：大多数论文误认了GDPR的法律依据；极少数论文涉及欧盟法院（CJEU）的“Dun & Bradstreet”判决（可能是由于发表时间原因）；此外，解释形式（由接收者决定）与解释内容（由法律目的决定）之间的区别经常被混淆。

We conceptualize this as the Addressee/Purpose Framework, propose a four-phase blueprint for operationalization, and identify six concrete open research questions. Without further progress, the Right to Explanation risks remaining a formal obligation without a technically realizable path to compliance.

我们将此概念化为“接收者/目的框架”（Addressee/Purpose Framework），提出了一个四阶段的操作蓝图，并确定了六个具体的开放性研究问题。如果不能取得进一步进展，“解释权”恐将沦为一种缺乏技术实现路径的空洞法律义务。