Power Relations / 权力关系

you may not have all you want, all you need all that you have had was given by some hand it could change, it could stay the same who will say? who will make the claim? the situation we are in at this time neither a good one, nor is it so unblessed it can change, it can stay the same I could say, I could play the game ~ Gentle Giant, “Proclamation”, The Power and the Glory (1974) 你可能无法拥有你想要的一切，你所需的一切，你所拥有的一切，皆由某人之手所赐。它可能会改变，也可能保持不变。谁能断言？谁能宣称？我们当下的处境，既非尽善尽美，亦非无可救药。它可能会改变，也可能保持不变。我可以诉说，我可以参与这场游戏。—— Gentle Giant，《Proclamation》，《The Power and the Glory》（1974）

This essay attempts to explain power, responsibility, reputation, and courtesy in the context of long-distance communication-oriented relationships. 本文旨在探讨在以远程通信为导向的关系背景下，权力、责任、声誉和礼仪的内涵。

Category of responsibilities 责任范畴

The Boss: You owe Slim. Slim owes me. You owe me. Jason Smilovic, Lucky Number Slevin (2006) 老板：你欠 Slim 的。Slim 欠我的。你欠我的。—— Jason Smilovic，《幸运数字斯莱文》（2006）

To start, what is power? Using more grammar: what does it mean for one person to have power over another? Too many words have been spilled on the topic, so I will demystify it by suggesting that power is a synonym for responsibility; one person has power over another person precisely when they are responsible for that person. 首先，什么是权力？用更严谨的语法来说：一个人对另一个人拥有权力意味着什么？关于这个话题已经有太多的论述，因此我将通过提出“权力是责任的同义词”这一观点来揭开它的神秘面纱；当一个人对另一个人负有责任时，他便对那个人拥有权力。

To have the power of life and death is to have the responsibility for choosing between life and death; to have the power of where to go for lunch is to have the responsibility of choosing where to go for lunch. 拥有生杀大权，意味着有责任在生与死之间做出选择；拥有决定午餐去哪吃的权力，意味着有责任选择去哪里吃午餐。

An immediate and common retort is that power is hard or soft; hard power is physics and soft power is responsibility. A variety of misunderstood statements attesting to the distinction are well-known; here are a few common examples: 一个直接且常见的反驳是：权力分为硬权力和软权力；硬权力是物理，软权力是责任。许多对这种区别的误解性陈述广为人知；以下是几个常见的例子：

Every Communist must grasp the truth, “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party. ~ Mao Zedong, 1927 每个共产党员都必须掌握这个真理：“枪杆子里面出政权。”我们的原则是党指挥枪，而决不允许枪指挥党。—— 毛泽东，1927

Some people think they can outsmart me. Maybe. Maybe. I’ve yet to meet one that can outsmart bullet. ~ Heavy Weapons Guy, 2007 有些人以为他们能比我聪明。也许吧。也许吧。但我还没见过谁能比子弹更聪明。—— 重装机兵（Heavy Weapons Guy），2007

We are all victims of physics. unknown 21st-century scientist 我们都是物理学的受害者。—— 21世纪无名科学家

I will directly answer this request for nuance by insisting that physics is local: actions taken in a location in the past take time to propagate to other locations in the future. Locality immediately requires physical existence to lack realism by the Kochen-Specker theorem; it is thus indefinite and probabilistic. 我将通过坚持“物理是局域的”这一观点来直接回应这种对细微差别的要求：过去在某地采取的行动，需要时间才能传播到未来的其他地点。根据 Kochen-Specker 定理，局域性直接要求物理存在缺乏实在性；因此，它是非确定性的且具有概率性。

I will further insist that we are responsible for the choices that we locally make in our immediate surroundings; we have the power to alter the space near us, and we choose how to use this power partially by imagining the responsibility of control over that space. 我进一步坚持认为，我们对自己周围局部范围内所做的选择负责；我们有权改变身边的空间，而我们选择如何使用这种权力，部分取决于我们对控制该空间所承担责任的想象。

However, this allows me to note that power does not grow out of a gun, but out of the responsibility associated with aiming, firing, and maintaining a gun in a particular location; any claim about the hard physics of power can be recast as a claim about the soft responsibilities of power which invoke those physical consequences. 然而，这让我指出：权力并非出自枪杆子，而是出自与在特定地点瞄准、射击和维护枪支相关的责任；任何关于权力硬物理的论断，都可以重构为关于引发这些物理后果的权力软责任的论断。

If there were only one person then they would be responsible for themselves, and thus have power over themselves. Moreover, if there were two distinct people and one had power over another, it is almost never total power; that is, not all responsibilities are delegated from one person to another even in a situation of total surrender or helplessness. 如果只有一个人，那么他对自己负责，从而对自己拥有权力。此外，如果有两个不同的人，其中一人对另一人拥有权力，这几乎绝非完全的权力；也就是说，即使在完全投降或无助的情况下，并非所有的责任都会从一个人委托给另一个人。

I don’t say this to make light of such situations, but merely to point out that instead of a singular power, we ought to discuss many multiple different powers which can all be independently delegated. A responsibility may be delegated from one person to another; thus, power may be delegated. 我这么说并非为了轻视此类处境，而仅仅是为了指出：我们不应讨论单一的权力，而应讨论多种可以独立委托的不同权力。一项责任可以从一个人委托给另一个人；因此，权力是可以被委托的。

Moreover, for any responsibility already delegated to a person, they have the power to further delegate it; thus, delegation is itself a source of responsibilities. We will investigate the structural consequences of this curious recursion. 此外，对于任何已经委托给某人的责任，他们有权进一步将其委托出去；因此，委托本身就是责任的来源。我们将研究这种奇特递归的结构性后果。

First, we will do some mathematics. A category, mathematically speaking, is a collection of directed arrows which admit composition in the sense that any two compatible arrows may be combined into a single larger arrow. To record that compatibility, every arrow is associated with a source and target, such that composition is only possible when the first arrow’s target is the second arrow’s source. 首先，我们来做一些数学运算。从数学上讲，范畴（Category）是一组有向箭头的集合，这些箭头允许复合，即任何两个兼容的箭头都可以组合成一个更大的箭头。为了记录这种兼容性，每个箭头都关联着一个源和一个目标，只有当第一个箭头的目标是第二个箭头的源时，复合才有可能实现。

Here, we will consider a category of responsibilities whose arrows are delegations of power from one source person to another target person. We will not think of any category in particular, but consider properties of any category of responsibilities. 在这里，我们将考虑一个责任范畴，其箭头是从一个源人到另一个目标人的权力委托。我们不会局限于任何特定的范畴，而是考虑任何责任范畴的属性。

There are some expected properties of categories. For each source/target, which mathematicians call an object, there exists an identity arrow having that object as its source and target which does nothing. Moreover, for each arrow, composition with these identity arrows, whether precomposition with the source or postcomposition with the target, is the identity operation; composition with identities does nothing. 范畴有一些预期的属性。对于每个源/目标（数学家称之为对象），都存在一个以该对象为源和目标的恒等箭头，它不执行任何操作。此外，对于每个箭头，与这些恒等箭头的复合（无论是与源的前复合还是与目标后复合）都是恒等运算；与恒等式的复合不会产生任何改变。

To meet these requirements, for each person there is an identity arrow for which they are the source and target and which delegates no power whatsoever, such that composition with an identity arrow delegates exactly what was delegated before. 为了满足这些要求，每个人都有一个以自己为源和目标的恒等箭头，它不委托任何权力，因此与恒等箭头的复合所委托的内容与之前完全一致。

A transitive relation R is one such that if xRy and yRz then xRz. For example, if x < y and y < z then x < z. We will add similar transitivity into our category whenever a relationship recurs between people, although it is required to be exactly the same relation in all three cases. 传递关系 R 是指如果 xRy 且 yRz，则 xRz。例如，如果 x < y 且 y < z，则 x < z。每当人与人之间出现重复关系时，我们都会在范畴中加入类似的传递性，尽管要求这三种情况下的关系必须完全相同。

For example, returning to the beginning of this section, if Alice owes Bob and Bob owes Carol in kind then Alice owes Carol in kind. Intuitively, this transitive property allows any power delegated to a target person to also be a power delegated by a source person, and a delegation with an intermediary is equivalent to a delegation without an intermediary. 例如，回到本节开头，如果 Alice 欠 Bob，而 Bob 以同样的方式欠 Carol，那么 Alice 就欠 Carol。直观地说，这种传递属性允许任何委托给目标人的权力也成为源人委托的权力，而有中间人的委托等同于没有中间人的委托。

That doesn’t sound right, though. An intermediary could choose to change their current commitments, giving the system an extra degree of freedom in its dynamics. What an individual category actually represents is a possible snapshot of the static delegations at a moment in time. If, at that moment in time, Alice happens to be paying Bob and Bob happens to be paying Carol, then Alice happens to be paying Carol; bu 但这听起来不太对劲。中间人可以选择改变他们当前的承诺，从而为系统的动态提供额外的自由度。单个范畴实际上代表的是某一时刻静态委托的可能快照。如果在那一时刻，Alice 恰好在支付给 Bob，而 Bob 恰好在支付给 Carol，那么 Alice 恰好就在支付给 Carol；但……