European Commission Revives Push for Encryption Backdoors in ProtectEU Strategy

欧盟委员会在“ProtectEU”战略中重启加密后门计划

European Commission Revives Push for Encryption Backdoors in ProtectEU Strategy, Framing Mass Surveillance as “Lawful Access” 欧盟委员会在“ProtectEU”战略中重启加密后门计划，将大规模监控包装为“合法访问”

The EU’s ProtectEU strategy quietly sketches the blueprint for a backdoor. 欧盟的“ProtectEU”战略悄然勾勒出了加密后门的蓝图。

The EU is once again looking for a way to undermine end-to-end encryption in the name of strengthening law enforcement capabilities, this time via a new strategy, ProtectEU. 欧盟再次试图以加强执法能力为名，寻求削弱端到端加密的方法，而这一次是通过一项名为“ProtectEU”的新战略。

The internal security strategy, announced this week by the EU Commission, is presented as a “vision and workplan” that will span a number of years but stops short of making concrete policy proposals. 欧盟委员会本周宣布的这项内部安全战略被定位为一项跨越多年的“愿景与工作计划”，但目前尚未提出具体的政策建议。

A press release asserts that the current geopolitical environment is one of “growing” threats from hostile states, and mentions powerful criminal groups and terrorists who are “operating increasingly online” – as well as “surging cybercrime and attacks against our critical infrastructure.” 一份新闻稿声称，当前的地缘政治环境面临来自敌对国家“日益增长”的威胁，并提到了那些“越来越多地在网上活动”的强大犯罪集团和恐怖分子，以及“激增的网络犯罪和针对我们关键基础设施的攻击”。

With the threat elements defined in this way, the EU’s new strategy focuses on six areas, one of them being “more effective tools for law enforcement” – which is where online encryption comes under attack. 在以这种方式定义威胁因素后，欧盟的新战略聚焦于六大领域，其中之一是“为执法部门提供更有效的工具”——而这正是网络加密受到攻击的地方。

When it describes how the groundwork might be laid for mandating encryption backdoors, the EU chooses to use euphemisms such as creating roadmaps for “lawful and effective access to data for law enforcement” and seeking “technological solutions for accessing encrypted data.” 在描述如何为强制实施加密后门奠定基础时，欧盟选择了使用委婉语，例如制定“执法部门合法且有效地访问数据”的路线图，以及寻求“访问加密数据的技术解决方案”。

A technology roadmap on encryption would allow for these “solutions” to be found. The EU is not alone in searching for mechanisms to, eventually, legislate against encryption, but these initiatives are invariably met with warnings from both tech companies and civil rights and privacy advocates. 一份关于加密的技术路线图将使这些“解决方案”得以被发现。欧盟并非唯一寻求最终通过立法反对加密的实体，但这些举措总是遭到科技公司以及民权和隐私倡导者的警告。

The key issue is that encryption provides both for private communications (which is what law enforcement wants access to) and also the technical security of those communications, financial transactions, etc. 核心问题在于，加密既保障了私人通信（执法部门想要访问的内容），也保障了这些通信、金融交易等活动的技术安全性。

The new EU strategy promises that cybersecurity and fundamental rights will be protected as a future encryption backdoor is implemented. 欧盟的新战略承诺，在未来实施加密后门时，网络安全和基本权利将得到保护。

But this is not a promise anyone can make, considering that once there, a backdoor is effectively available to all actors, including those hostile states and non-state actors the EU purports its strategy is there to protect against. 但考虑到一旦后门存在，它实际上将对所有参与者开放，包括那些欧盟声称其战略旨在防御的敌对国家和非国家行为体，这并不是任何人都能做出的承诺。

Other prominent points contained in ProtectEU include increased intelligence sharing between member countries and the bloc’s Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) – as a way to “anticipate” security threats. “ProtectEU”中包含的其他重点内容包括加强成员国之间以及与欧盟单一情报分析能力（SIAC）之间的情报共享，以此作为“预判”安全威胁的一种方式。

Yet another centralization effort is the idea to give EU’s law enforcement agency EUROPOL more powers, including around cross-border and large-scale investigations, in the process making it “a truly operational police agency.” 另一项集权举措是赋予欧盟执法机构欧洲刑警组织（EUROPOL）更多权力，包括处理跨境和大规模调查的权力，从而使其成为“一个真正的行动型警察机构”。

This is followed by reassuring member countries that the purpose is to “reinforce support” to them. 随后，欧盟向成员国保证，此举的目的是为了“加强对它们的支持”。