Why China Is the Bogeyman Data Center Enthusiasts Just Can’t Quit

为什么中国成了数据中心拥护者挥之不去的“替罪羊”

It’s been a rough summer for data center boosters. Polling is getting even more dismal—as many as 75 percent of Americans now say they would oppose a data center being built in their area, up from 42 percent last year. Politicians from both parties who were previously advocates, like Texas governor Greg Abbott and Pennsylvania governor Josh Shapiro, are now switching up as the midterms approach, looking to convey to voters that they’re talking a hard line on the hated infrastructure.

对于数据中心的拥护者来说，这个夏天过得相当艰难。民意调查结果愈发惨淡——高达 75% 的美国人表示反对在他们居住的地区建设数据中心，而去年这一比例仅为 42%。随着中期选举临近，此前曾支持该行业的两党政客（如德克萨斯州州长格雷格·阿博特和宾夕法尼亚州州长乔什·夏皮罗）纷纷改变立场，试图向选民展示他们对这一备受诟病的基础设施采取了强硬态度。

But while some Republicans are turning tail on the issue even in the face of President Donald Trump’s vigorous support for data center construction, others are joining prominent tech leaders in doubling down on an old narrative: That China is responsible for all this malaise.

尽管唐纳德·特朗普总统大力支持数据中心建设，但一些共和党人仍在此问题上退缩；与此同时，另一些人则与知名科技领袖一道，加倍渲染一种老套的叙事：中国应对这一切乱象负责。

In late August, X announced that it had identified 200 accounts linked to China that were helping to spread anti-data center talking points on the platform, causing a flurry of alarmist headlines and tweets. (“China is secretly fueling America’s data center rage,” Axios trumpeted in an article on X’s report, which data center-friendly politicians and right-wing figures amplified using X itself.) Even the president joined in: “China could not be happier with this anti Data Center movement,” he wrote in a Truth Social post defending data centers (“let Data Reign!”) made just a few days after the X report.

8 月下旬，X（原推特）宣布已识别出 200 个与中国有关联的账户，这些账户在平台上协助传播反数据中心的言论，引发了一阵危言耸听的头条新闻和推文。（Axios 在一篇关于 X 报告的文章中宣称：“中国正在暗中煽动美国对数据中心的愤怒”，而支持数据中心的政客和右翼人士则利用 X 平台放大了这一说法。）甚至连总统也参与其中：在 X 发布报告几天后，他在“真实社交”（Truth Social）上发帖捍卫数据中心（“让数据统治一切！”），并写道：“中国对这场反数据中心运动感到再高兴不过了。”

The idea that Americans hate data centers because of a nebulous foreign influence operation—not because of a slew of environmental worries, an oligarch-friendly political system, or a general resistance to AI—is a handy excuse for the technology’s backers and their allies. And it’s one that’s been hanging around for a few months. In the spring, a handful of reports from right-wing policy shops were used by lawmakers and pundits alike to point fingers at the Chinese Communist Party for purportedly seeding anti-data center narratives among the American public. In June, OpenAI banned a cluster of users it had found that, the company said, were linked to the Chinese government and “testing narratives against AI infrastructure.”

认为美国人讨厌数据中心是因为某种模糊的外国影响行动，而不是因为一系列环境担忧、偏袒寡头的政治体制或对人工智能的普遍抵触，这为该技术的支持者及其盟友提供了一个方便的借口。这种说法已经流传了几个月。今年春天，一些右翼智库发布的报告被立法者和评论员利用，指责中国共产党涉嫌在美国公众中散布反数据中心的叙事。6 月，OpenAI 封禁了一批用户，称其与中国政府有关联，并正在“测试针对人工智能基础设施的叙事”。

But claims that Americans hate data centers because of Chinese influence are based on pretty thin evidence. The biggest report circulating around DC claiming foreign influence, China experts told me earlier this year, leans heavily on insinuations and assumptions with precious little hard evidence. In its own report from June, OpenAI acknowledged that the cluster of accounts it identified was simply exploiting existing discontent around data centers. It’s possible X’s recent purge may be linked to the accounts flagged by OpenAI: They use similar hashtags and images, and several link to the same obscure local news article. X ultimately identified 200,000 accounts in the same bot farm; the 200 anti-data center accounts were just a drop in the larger bucket.

然而，关于美国人因中国影响而讨厌数据中心的说法，其证据非常薄弱。中国问题专家今年早些时候告诉我，华盛顿流传的关于外国影响的最大报告，严重依赖暗示和假设，几乎没有任何确凿证据。OpenAI 在 6 月份的报告中也承认，其识别出的那批账户只是在利用围绕数据中心现有的不满情绪。X 最近的清理行动可能与 OpenAI 标记的账户有关：它们使用相似的标签和图片，且有几个账户链接到了同一篇冷门的地方新闻报道。X 最终在同一个僵尸网络中识别出了 20 万个账户；那 200 个反数据中心账户只是沧海一粟。

Do blue-check tech types and Republicans keep hammering on the China angle because they know something that the public doesn’t? Graphika, a social media analytics firm that has been tracking data center sentiment online, told me in June that most of the opposition they had seen thus far was homegrown. That hasn’t changed: There’s still very little evidence of significant foreign intervention, Tyler Williams, vice president of intelligence at Graphika, told me this week.

那些拥有“蓝标”认证的科技界人士和共和党人是否因为掌握了公众不知道的信息，才不断炒作中国因素？社交媒体分析公司 Graphika 一直在追踪网络上关于数据中心的情绪，该公司在 6 月份告诉我，他们迄今为止看到的大多数反对声音都源于本土。这种情况并没有改变：Graphika 情报副总裁泰勒·威廉姆斯（Tyler Williams）本周告诉我，目前几乎没有证据表明存在重大的外国干预。

Blogger Andy Masley has a healthy skepticism of the China narrative. Masley, whose blog is largely funded by a grant from effective altruist philanthropy Coefficient Giving, is popular with tech boosters on X for his pro-data center takes. But “as soon as I start talking China, they get quiet,” he tells me. “It seems like a very convenient belief. I have my own biases as a Democrat, but I sometimes look at these [tech] guys and think, ‘Oh, they had to meme themselves into being more right-wing a few years ago. They think right-wing people like it when you talk about China.’”

博主安迪·马斯利（Andy Masley）对“中国叙事”持合理的怀疑态度。马斯利的博客主要由有效利他主义慈善机构 Coefficient Giving 资助，他因支持数据中心的观点而在 X 上的科技拥护者中很受欢迎。但他告诉我：“一旦我开始谈论中国，他们就沉默了。这似乎是一个非常方便的信仰。作为民主党人，我有自己的偏见，但我有时看着这些（科技）家伙会想，‘哦，几年前他们不得不通过玩梗让自己变得更右倾。他们认为右翼人士喜欢听关于中国的话题。’”

Masley has put out a public call for any insider information from the tech world about Chinese intervention; he says he hasn’t gotten anything solid yet. It’s also worth noting that right-wing attempts to blame China for sowing data center discord come as members of the Trump administration complain that Chinese firms are stealing American advances in AI. If you’re having trouble wrapping your head around why China would try to muddy the waters around the infrastructure that its AI models are allegedly据称正在利用的基础设施，你并不是唯一一个感到困惑的人。

马斯利已公开征集科技界关于中国干预的任何内幕信息；他说目前还没有得到任何实质性内容。同样值得注意的是，右翼试图将数据中心的不和归咎于中国，正值特朗普政府成员抱怨中国公司窃取美国人工智能进展之际。如果你想不通为什么中国会试图搅浑其人工智能模型据称正在利用的基础设施，你并不是唯一一个感到困惑的人。

I took my obsession over this topic to Louise Matsakis, WIRED’s senior business editor and resident China expert. She says that this whole episode belies a basic misunderstanding of what Chinese influence campaigns actually look like—and she also didn’t seem surprised that this narrative was taking off like wildfire among factions on the right, which has a long history of pointing the finger at China for American problems. Louise tells me that, at the end of the day, panics like these are not really about China at all.

我带着对这个话题的执着请教了《连线》（WIRED）高级商业编辑、常驻中国问题专家路易丝·马萨基斯（Louise Matsakis）。她说，整件事反映出人们对中国影响力行动的本质存在根本性的误解——她对这种叙事在右翼派系中迅速蔓延也并不感到惊讶，因为右翼长期以来一直有将美国问题归咎于中国的历史。路易丝告诉我，归根结底，这类恐慌根本不是关于中国的。

“It is endlessly fascinating to me how China becomes a scapegoat,” she says. “Americans often find it easier to put the blame on a nebulous other, rather than to actually look at themselves.”

“中国如何成为替罪羊，这让我感到无比着迷，”她说。“美国人往往觉得把责任推给一个模糊的‘他者’，比真正审视自己要容易得多。”