The 2008 economic crisis changed the US’s relationship with energy

2008年经济危机改变了美国与能源的关系

One argument that often comes up about climate change is that fossil fuels are good because they powered economic growth that has left most people better off overall. And, to an extent, that has been true, but it’s also an extremely limited perspective. It’s pretty obvious now that the growth they powered has come with very high costs that we’ve only recently started to pay, in the form of damages and disruptions from extreme weather events. With things like sea level rise expected to continue for centuries even if we hit net zero, it’s difficult to estimate how expensive that growth will eventually be. But that perspective is also limited: We now have better ways to power our growth—ways that are less environmentally damaging now and won’t leave our descendants with a carbon debt that will be difficult to manage.

关于气候变化，经常出现的一种论点是：化石燃料是有益的，因为它们推动了经济增长，使大多数人的生活总体上变得更好。在某种程度上，这确实是事实，但这也是一种极其局限的视角。现在显而易见的是，它们所推动的增长伴随着极高的代价，而我们直到最近才开始通过极端天气事件带来的破坏和干扰来支付这些代价。即便我们实现了净零排放，海平面上升等问题预计仍将持续数百年，因此很难估算这种增长最终会付出多大的代价。但这种视角同样存在局限：我们现在拥有更好的方式来推动增长——这些方式在当下对环境的破坏较小，也不会给我们的后代留下难以处理的碳债务。

In 2013, I was introduced to a metaphor about changing the relationship between economic growth and fossil fuel use: opening scissors. For decades, GDP growth and carbon emissions were locked together like the two blades of a closed pair of scissors. The idea was that we needed to open them: continue GDP growth (ideally in ways that improved citizens’ lives), but disconnect it from carbon emissions.

2013年，我接触到了一个关于改变经济增长与化石燃料使用之间关系的隐喻：剪刀差（opening scissors）。几十年来，GDP增长和碳排放就像一把闭合剪刀的两片刀刃一样紧紧锁在一起。其核心理念在于我们需要将它们“打开”：在保持GDP增长（理想情况下是以改善公民生活的方式）的同时，将其与碳排放脱钩。

At the time, Sweden provided an example of this. In 1996, its carbon emissions began a gradual decline that has continued to the present, with total emissions down by a third from its recent peak in 1996 and more than half from its maximum levels in 1970. But its GDP continued growing. At the time, the data only went as far as 2011, but the World Bank now shows its GDP as having more than doubled since 1996. In 2013, it was possible to question whether the Swedish example really represented a long-term transition. But with 30 years of data, it is now very clear that Sweden had opened the scissors.

当时，瑞典提供了一个很好的例子。1996年，瑞典的碳排放量开始逐渐下降，并持续至今。其总排放量较1996年的近期峰值下降了三分之一，较1970年的最高水平下降了一半以上。但与此同时，其GDP却在持续增长。当时的数据仅更新到2011年，但世界银行现在的数据显示，瑞典的GDP自1996年以来已经翻了一番多。在2013年，人们或许还会质疑瑞典的例子是否真的代表了一种长期的转型。但有了30年的数据支撑，现在非常清楚的是，瑞典确实已经成功实现了“剪刀差”。

A larger question was whether its example was applicable elsewhere. Sweden was fortunate to have lots of hydropower and an established base of nuclear reactors. And its economy, while substantial, isn’t as diversified as that of some larger countries. Like, for example, the United States. It wasn’t clear what the future of US carbon emissions would look like in 2013. After several decades of steady growth, they dropped precipitously following the 2008 economic crisis, then stabilized with a few ups and downs during a few years of tepid economic growth. It was unclear whether the previous relationship between growth and emissions would reassert itself.

一个更大的问题是，瑞典的经验是否适用于其他地方。瑞典很幸运，拥有丰富的水力发电和成熟的核反应堆基础。而且，尽管瑞典经济规模可观，但并不像一些大国那样多元化。例如，美国。2013年时，美国碳排放的未来走向尚不明确。在经历了数十年的稳步增长后，受2008年经济危机影响，美国碳排放量急剧下降，随后在几年温和的经济增长中趋于平稳，期间略有波动。当时尚不清楚增长与排放之间曾经的关联是否会卷土重来。

I follow energy issues and track the annual data as it comes in. Despite that, it has been tough to develop a clear picture of what emissions are doing in the US. For a while, it looked like we had moved into a sawtooth pattern, where several years of gradual decline would be largely offset by a sudden rise. Then there was a dramatic plunge and rebound during the pandemic years, followed by a few years of minimal change. Even in years when emissions declined, it was hard to feel confident that it represented part of a larger trend. So I decided to look for myself. And when you graph the data, it’s clear that 2008 created an inflection point; since then, carbon emissions have trended downward despite year-to-year variability. As you can see in my graph, that has not come at the cost of economic growth—outside of the pandemic, that has remained steady. The US has opened the scissors, too.

我一直关注能源问题并追踪每年的数据。尽管如此，要清晰地描绘出美国碳排放的走势依然困难。有一段时间，我们似乎进入了一种“锯齿状”模式：几年的缓慢下降会被随后的突然上升所抵消。随后，疫情期间出现了剧烈的下降和反弹，紧接着是几年微小的变化。即使在排放量下降的年份，也很难确信这是否代表了一种更大的趋势。因此，我决定亲自研究一下。当你把数据绘制成图表时，很明显2008年是一个转折点；从那时起，尽管每年都有波动，但碳排放量总体呈下降趋势。正如你在我的图表中看到的那样，这种下降并没有以牺牲经济增长为代价——除了疫情期间，经济增长一直保持稳定。美国也已经成功实现了“剪刀差”。

There are plenty of reasons to remain pessimistic. Even if emissions are trending downward, they’re not falling fast enough to help us avoid some of the worst impacts of climate change. Data centers are booming and often come with their own fleets of fossil fuel generators. The Trump administration is overtly hostile to renewable energy and even the slightest hint that it’s possible to do things efficiently. GDP also gives a limited picture of economic growth and says nothing about whether, or how, a population might be benefiting from it. All that aside, the last decade-plus clearly indicates that the US can continue growing without rising carbon emissions. So even if emissions rise over the next few years, we can know it isn’t because it was necessary for economic growth, or that it is an inevitable reversal of recent trends.

我们有充分的理由保持悲观。即使排放量呈下降趋势，其下降速度也不足以帮助我们避免气候变化带来的一些最严重的后果。数据中心正在蓬勃发展，且往往配备自己的化石燃料发电机组。特朗普政府对可再生能源持公开敌视态度，甚至对任何关于“提高效率”的暗示都表现出排斥。GDP对经济增长的描述也存在局限性，它无法说明民众是否从中受益，或以何种方式受益。撇开这些不谈，过去十多年的情况清楚地表明，美国可以在不增加碳排放的情况下持续增长。因此，即使未来几年排放量有所上升，我们也可以确定，这并非经济增长的必要条件，也不是近期趋势的必然逆转。