The Escalation of War in Ethiopia

埃塞俄比亚战争的升级

The coming proxy wars will be devastating for civilians and do little to improve governance and human welfare in Ethiopia and the wider Horn. 即将到来的代理人战争将对平民造成毁灭性打击，且无助于改善埃塞俄比亚及整个非洲之角的治理与民生。

I: On Ethiopia’s wars of choice, motivated by historical grievances and elite hubris

一、关于埃塞俄比亚的选择性战争：源于历史积怨与精英傲慢

This is from the ICG: Northern Ethiopia is slipping into renewed war. After months of building tensions, on 23 September large-scale hostilities broke out between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and Amhara Fano militias, on one side, and the federal government and allied Tigrayan forces on the other. Responsibility for the escalation lies primarily with the TPLF, which launched ground assaults in coordination with other rebels with whom it has joined hands in a new alliance that vows to overthrow Ethiopia’s government. The upsurge in fighting comes almost five months after the TPLF retook power in the Tigray region, dealing a blow to a 2022 peace deal that had ended the last Tigray war and leading Addis Ababa to mount an intensifying drone campaign against TPLF forces. 以下内容来自国际危机组织（ICG）：埃塞俄比亚北部正滑向新一轮战争。经过数月的紧张局势升级，9月23日，提格雷人民解放阵线（TPLF）与阿姆哈拉法诺（Fano）民兵组织，与联邦政府及其盟友提格雷部队之间爆发了大规模敌对行动。此次升级的主要责任在于TPLF，该组织与其他反政府武装结成新联盟，并发动地面袭击，誓言推翻埃塞俄比亚政府。此次战斗激化发生在该组织重新夺回提格雷地区政权近五个月后，这不仅打击了2022年结束上一次提格雷战争的和平协议，也导致亚的斯亚贝巴对TPLF部队发起了日益猛烈的无人机攻势。

I maintain that war in Ethiopia (and the wider Horn) is not inevitable. The current outbreak of war reflects the fact that Ethiopian elites keep choosing war over peace. Unfortunately, despite repeatedly choosing war, Ethiopian leaders continue to enjoy support from a cast of warmongering academics, journalists, public intellectuals, civil society actors, and a whole host of foreign actors — all of whom have long taken sides and become cheerleaders for their respective camps. 我坚持认为，埃塞俄比亚（及整个非洲之角）的战争并非不可避免。当前战争的爆发反映出一个事实：埃塞俄比亚精英阶层不断选择战争而非和平。不幸的是，尽管屡次选择战争，埃塞俄比亚领导人仍继续得到一批好战的学者、记者、公共知识分子、公民社会人士以及众多外国势力的支持——他们早已选边站队，成为了各自阵营的啦啦队长。

Let’s be blunt. There are a lot of things not to like about the Abiy Ahmed administration. The strong elements of autocratic intolerance, often expressed in the form of indiscriminate force. The unwillingness to (publicly) countenance alternative worldviews and policy positions. The abiding reliance on the old vindictive governance styles anchored around identity politics and collective punishment. And the hubristic promotion of a personality cult, which makes it difficult to build the broad and durable coalitions needed to govern a diverse country like Ethiopia. Perhaps the political situation would be marginally better if Prime Minister Abiy were a better politician. However, I doubt it. To understand why, it’s worth stepping back to appreciate the structural drivers of elite instability and conflict in Ethiopia. 坦率地说，阿比·艾哈迈德（Abiy Ahmed）政府有很多令人不满之处。其强烈的独裁不容忍倾向，常表现为不加区分的武力使用；不愿（公开）容忍其他世界观和政策立场；长期依赖以身份政治和集体惩罚为核心的旧式报复性治理；以及傲慢地推行个人崇拜，这使得建立治理埃塞俄比亚这样一个多元国家所需的广泛且持久的联盟变得困难。也许如果阿比总理是一位更好的政治家，政治局势会稍微好一点。但我对此表示怀疑。要理解原因，有必要退一步审视埃塞俄比亚精英阶层不稳定和冲突的结构性驱动因素。

The last three decades in Ethiopia have been a search for a new myth. The ethno-federalist system had legitimate logic: bringing about the dignity of (cultural and linguistic) difference between nations and nationalities. However, its rhetoric was drawn from the difficult past instead of the hope of better future. To make matters worse, it became a breeding ground for social and economic injustice. In the absence of farsighted political elites who may have been able to craft a new inclusive myth out of the stories of nations and nationalities, ethnic groups had to walk back to find their stories in their own small compartments. This exacerbated narrow ethnic histories and ideals. 过去三十年，埃塞俄比亚一直在寻找一种新的“神话”。民族联邦制曾有其合理的逻辑：即实现各民族和国族之间（文化和语言）差异的尊严。然而，其话语体系源于艰难的过去，而非对美好未来的希望。更糟糕的是，它成为了社会和经济不公的温床。由于缺乏能够从各民族故事中构建出一种包容性新神话的远见卓识的政治精英，各族群不得不退回到各自的小圈子里寻找自己的叙事。这加剧了狭隘的民族历史观和理想。

It’s easy to demonize Abiy. But the hard truth is that Ethiopia’s structural problems preceded him and, if left unresolved, will outlast him. Those beating the war drums the loudest in Ethiopia — and who’ve trashed the Pretoria Agreement — are convinced that Ethiopia can only be well governed if they are in charge. Nearly all are motivated by maximalist demands and are quick to weaponize legitimate historical grievances for parochial ends. The leading characters involved are (mostly) men out to settle decades-old scores and who prefer to go out fighting rather than accept political defeat by their perceived inferiors. These same characters have been able to mobilize fighters under the banner of uncompromising primordislist ethno-nationalism and commitments to their respective ethno-states. 妖魔化阿比很容易。但残酷的事实是，埃塞俄比亚的结构性问题在他之前就已经存在，如果得不到解决，在他之后也将持续存在。那些在埃塞俄比亚敲响战鼓最响亮的人——以及那些撕毁《比勒陀利亚协议》的人——坚信只有由他们掌权，埃塞俄比亚才能被治理好。几乎所有人都受到极端主义诉求的驱动，并迅速将合法的历史积怨武器化，以达到狭隘的目的。参与其中的主要人物（大多）是那些试图清算几十年旧账的人，他们宁愿战死也不愿接受被他们视为“下等人”的对手在政治上击败。正是这些人，能够以不妥协的原始民族主义和对各自民族国家的承诺为旗帜，动员武装人员。

In light of all this, Teklehaymanot G. Weldemichel is spot in making the case for following through on the Pretoria Agreement. Yes, it is imperfect and the various belligerents haven’t always followed through on the deal’s requirements. However, the deal “brought large-scale fighting to an end and contains commitments that address some key unresolved issues.” It’s a start. It ought to be given a chance. Unfortunately, the plight of civilians hardly ever features in the calculus of the warmongers. Estimate vary, but the death toll in the Tigray war may have been as high as a staggering 600,000. This is a monumentally catastrophic figure. Even the lower bound estimates out there would make it one of the deadliest wars of the 21st century. Given what we know about how belligerents go about waging war in Ethiopia (including by exacerbating the problem of food insecurity), why would anyone support a return to all-out war? Why are Ethiopian leaders and their cheerleaders willing to impose such trauma on their peoples? 鉴于这一切，Teklehaymanot G. Weldemichel 在主张落实《比勒陀利亚协议》时是非常正确的。是的，该协议并不完美，各交战方也并未始终遵守协议要求。然而，该协议“结束了大规模战斗，并包含了解决一些关键未决问题的承诺”。这是一个开始，应该给它一个机会。不幸的是，平民的苦难几乎从未出现在好战者的考量中。据估计，提格雷战争的死亡人数可能高达惊人的60万人。这是一个极其灾难性的数字。即使是最低的估算，这也使其成为21世纪最致命的战争之一。鉴于我们了解交战方在埃塞俄比亚发动战争的方式（包括加剧粮食不安全问题），为什么还会有人支持重回全面战争？为什么埃塞俄比亚的领导人及其啦啦队长们愿意将这种创伤强加给他们的人民？

II: The wages of ethnic federalism

二、民族联邦制的代价

There is bound to be a lot of discourse on ethnic polarization as a driver of conflict in Ethiopia. However, it is worth also considering how Ethiopia’s brand of federalism contributes to ethnic polarization. Existing research shows that the creation of ethno-states after the end of the civil war increased the salience of ethnic difference: 关于民族极化作为埃塞俄比亚冲突驱动因素的讨论必然会很多。然而，同样值得考虑的是，埃塞俄比亚式的联邦制是如何助长民族极化的。现有研究表明，内战结束后民族国家的建立增加了民族差异的显著性：

“[I]ndividuals politically socialized under the conditions of ethnic federalism are indeed significantly more likely to embrace an ethnic rather than a national identity. However, generational affects do not appear to be related to perceptions of continuing ethnic federalism as a political arrangement. Differences of opinion on ethnic federalism are more a function of one’s group identity, rather than the intensity of…” “在民族联邦制条件下进行政治社会化的个人，确实明显更有可能拥抱民族认同而非国家认同。然而，代际影响似乎与将民族联邦制视为一种政治安排的认知无关。对民族联邦制的意见分歧更多地取决于个人的群体认同，而非……”