2026 Usage Policy update

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2026 Usage Policy update

Announcements 2026 年使用政策更新

2026 Usage Policy update 2026 年使用政策更新

Oct 8, 2026 2026 年 10 月 8 日

Each year, Anthropic updates its Usage Policy in response to the evolving capabilities of our models, and the feedback we’ve received from our customers. We’re publishing a new version of the policy today. In this post, we summarize the changes we’ve made. 每年，Anthropic 都会根据我们模型能力的演变以及从客户那里收到的反馈来更新我们的使用政策。我们今天发布了该政策的新版本。在这篇文章中，我们总结了所做的更改。

Most of the updates in the latest version are intended to clarify existing rules. In the year since our last refresh, Claude has taken on longer, more independent work. This update provides new examples that show how our rules apply to Claude’s new capabilities. It draws on new patterns of misuse in influence operations, weapons development, and surveillance that we’ve observed in the past year (as we’ve documented in our latest threat intelligence report). We’ve also made updates to clarify our requirements for high-risk use cases in areas like health and finance, to add controls for when Claude is used to autonomously take physical actions, and to address abusive behavior toward our models. 最新版本中的大多数更新旨在澄清现有规则。自我们上次更新以来的这一年里，Claude 承担了更长、更独立的工作。此次更新提供了新的示例，展示了我们的规则如何应用于 Claude 的新能力。它借鉴了我们在过去一年中观察到的影响力行动、武器开发和监视方面的新滥用模式（正如我们在最新的威胁情报报告中所记录的那样）。我们还进行了更新，以明确我们在健康和金融等领域的高风险用例要求，增加对 Claude 用于自主采取物理行动时的控制，并解决针对我们模型的滥用行为。

The updated policy takes effect on November 12. The full Usage Policy and Supported Regions Policy can be found on their respective pages. 更新后的政策将于 11 月 12 日生效。完整的使用政策和支持区域政策可在各自的页面上找到。

A new section on deceptive activity 关于欺骗性活动的新章节

As we wrote about last month, we’ve seen examples of state media outlets, government propaganda offices, and commercial firms using Claude to run networks of fake accounts and fabricated news sites. Our policy already prohibited this activity, but the restrictions were scattered across our elections, fraud, privacy, and disinformation sections. 正如我们上个月所写的那样，我们已经看到国家媒体机构、政府宣传办公室和商业公司使用 Claude 运营虚假账户网络和虚假新闻网站的例子。我们的政策已经禁止了这种活动，但这些限制分散在我们的选举、欺诈、隐私和虚假信息章节中。

We’ve consolidated those rules into a new section titled Do Not Engage in Deceptive Campaigns or Artificial Activity, which applies to deceptive activity of any kind (whether political or commercial). It covers efforts to obscure who is behind a message or amplify content through fake accounts or posts, along with building the tools and infrastructure for running influence operation campaigns. 我们将这些规则整合到一个名为“不得参与欺骗性活动或人为活动”的新章节中，该章节适用于任何类型的欺骗性活动（无论是政治性的还是商业性的）。它涵盖了试图掩盖消息背后的人，或通过虚假账户或帖子放大内容的行为，以及构建用于开展影响力行动的工具和基础设施。

Refocusing our elections section 重新聚焦我们的选举章节

We’ve refined our political content restrictions in each version of our Usage Policy in order to ensure that our models can be used appropriately in democratic processes. In this version, we’ve further sharpened our section on elections, focusing it specifically on disallowing the use of Claude to deceive voters or disrupt elections (for instance, by spreading false information about candidates or how to vote, impersonating candidates or election officials, or trying to suppress turnout). We’ve renamed it Do Not Undermine Democratic Processes to reflect that scope. 我们在每个版本的使用政策中都细化了政治内容限制，以确保我们的模型能够在民主进程中得到适当使用。在此版本中，我们进一步强化了关于选举的章节，专门聚焦于禁止使用 Claude 欺骗选民或干扰选举（例如，通过传播关于候选人或如何投票的虚假信息、冒充候选人或选举官员，或试图压制投票率）。我们将其更名为“不得破坏民主进程”以反映该范围。

For a similar reason, we’ve also removed our blanket prohibition on personalized vote and campaign targeting. This prohibition covered legitimate civic work, such as nonprofits using Claude to write information for voters in other languages, or election officials sending ballot cure notices. The behaviors that motivated the original rule (like voter targeting that relies on deception or the misuse of voters’ personal data) remain prohibited under our deceptive campaigns, surveillance, and privacy sections. 出于类似的原因，我们还取消了对个性化投票和竞选定位的全面禁止。这一禁令涵盖了合法的公民工作，例如非营利组织使用 Claude 为其他语言的选民编写信息，或选举官员发送选票补正通知。促成原始规则的行为（如依赖欺骗或滥用选民个人数据的选民定位）在我们的欺骗性活动、监视和隐私章节下仍然是被禁止的。

Clarifying our weapons prohibitions 澄清我们的武器禁令

Our Usage Policy has always prohibited using Claude to develop weapons. Recently, we’ve seen people attempt to use our models to build guidance and control software for weapons. The updated section makes clear that our prohibitions include the software and components that make weapons work, as well as actions like arming drones and other autonomous vehicles. These changes reflect how we’ve enforced our previous policy. 我们的使用政策一直禁止使用 Claude 开发武器。最近，我们看到有人试图使用我们的模型来构建武器的制导和控制软件。更新后的章节明确指出，我们的禁令包括使武器发挥作用的软件和组件，以及武装无人机和其他自动驾驶车辆等行动。这些变化反映了我们如何执行之前的政策。

More precise language on surveillance and law enforcement 关于监视和执法的更精确语言

Our September threat intelligence report documented the growing use of AI to build surveillance systems that identify and track political dissidents. We’ve rewritten our surveillance and criminal justice section to state more precisely what we prohibit. For instance, tracking people without their consent is prohibited, whether it happens in real time or through analysis of previously collected data. Claude cannot be used to decide or recommend who to investigate, arrest, or charge in a law enforcement or criminal justice process. We also prohibit Claude from being used to build or improve tools designed for surveillance. 我们 9 月份的威胁情报报告记录了人工智能在构建识别和追踪政治异见人士的监视系统方面的使用日益增加。我们重写了监视和刑事司法章节，以更精确地说明我们禁止的内容。例如，未经同意追踪他人是被禁止的，无论它是实时发生还是通过分析先前收集的数据。Claude 不能用于在执法或刑事司法过程中决定或建议调查、逮捕或起诉谁。我们还禁止将 Claude 用于构建或改进专为监视而设计的工具。

As with the previous update to our weapons prohibitions, this update does not reflect a change in what we enforce in practice: it is just intended to make our policy more explicit. The new section also spells out which uses remain permitted, including tracking that people have agreed to (such as fraud monitoring), content moderation, journalism, and legal research. 与之前对武器禁令的更新一样，此次更新并不反映我们在实践中执行的内容发生了变化：它只是旨在使我们的政策更加明确。新章节还阐明了哪些用途仍然被允许，包括人们同意的追踪（如欺诈监控）、内容审核、新闻报道和法律研究。

Clearer requirements for high-risk use cases 高风险用例的更明确要求

When our products are used in ways that can affect someone’s health, legal rights, finances, livelihood, or access to essential services, we require there to be a qualified “human in the loop” (that is, someone who has the authority to review and, if necessary, change Claude’s recommendations), and for the individual affected to be told that AI was used. 当我们的产品以可能影响某人的健康、合法权利、财务、生计或获得基本服务的方式使用时，我们要求必须有合格的“人在回路”（即有权审查并在必要时更改 Claude 建议的人），并且必须告知受影响的个人使用了人工智能。

These requirements haven’t changed with the updated version of our Usage Policy. However, users have often asked us whether a given use case has these requirements, so we’ve rewritten our High-risk Use Case Requirements section to answer that more directly. It now lists which kinds of recommendations are covered and which are not. 这些要求在更新后的使用政策版本中没有改变。然而，用户经常问我们某个特定的用例是否具有这些要求，因此我们重写了“高风险用例要求”章节，以更直接地回答这个问题。它现在列出了哪些类型的建议被涵盖，哪些不被涵盖。

Following the launch of our Model Hardware Standard, this section also adds requirements for the use of our models when they’re connected to hardware that takes autonomous physical actions and which might be capable of causing injury. A qualified operator must be able to observe the equipment and stop it if needed; the equipment must also be able to hold a safe state if Claude is disconnected. 继我们发布模型硬件标准之后，本节还增加了在我们的模型连接到采取自主物理行动且可能造成伤害的硬件时使用模型的要求。合格的操作员必须能够观察设备并在需要时停止它；如果 Claude 断开连接，设备也必须能够保持安全状态。

Addressing abusive behavior toward our models 解决针对我们模型的滥用行为

We’ve added a prohibition on sustained and needless abusive or cruel behavior toward our models. The policy update is meant to apply only in extreme cases, where users repeatedly act cruelly toward our models, with no discernible purpose. It does not apply to common versions of user 我们增加了一项禁令，禁止对我们的模型进行持续且不必要的辱骂或残忍行为。此次政策更新仅适用于极端情况，即用户在没有明显目的的情况下反复对我们的模型表现出残忍行为。它不适用于常见的用户版本