Inside the Muslim Manosphere Policing Women Online

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Save this storySave this storyMariam recently disabled Facebook Messenger. As the administrator of a Facebook group for women in the United Arab Emirates with close to 400,000 members, she’d become accustomed to receiving messages from strangers. But then came a shift in the volume—and nature—of those messages until they were impossible to ignore.

玛丽亚姆（Mariam）最近停用了 Facebook Messenger。作为阿联酋一个拥有近 40 万女性成员的 Facebook 群组管理员，她早已习惯收到陌生人的消息。但随后，这些消息的数量和性质发生了变化，直到她无法再忽视它们。

“Being the admin of this group has subjected me to all kinds of harassment,” says Miriam, who asked to be identified only by her first name because she fears online retaliation. They “either want to advise you to be holy and cover up, or they want to sexually harass you—or both.”

“作为这个群组的管理员，我遭受了各种各样的骚扰，”玛丽亚姆说。由于担心网络报复，她要求仅以名字称呼她。她说，这些人“要么想劝你保持圣洁并遮盖身体，要么想对你进行性骚扰——或者两者兼有。”

Mariam has run the group for more than a year. And even though intended for women, the group’s size and visibility has meant that Miriam also gets a lot of messages from men. She has received a deluge of unsolicited messages telling her how to dress, not to raise her voice or wear makeup, and to cover her hands with gloves so that no skin is visible.

玛丽亚姆经营这个群组已经一年多了。尽管该群组旨在服务女性，但其规模和知名度意味着玛丽亚姆也会收到许多来自男性的消息。她收到了大量未经请求的消息，告诉她该如何穿衣、不要提高嗓门或化妆，并要求她戴上手套遮住双手，以免露出皮肤。

“I couldn’t take it any longer. It was starting to affect my mental well-being,” Miriam says. Many women who are conspicuous on the internet have been harassed online. That comes in countless forms, even if the same misogyny underlies it. The particular variety Miriam was subjected to stems from a section of the “manosphere” dressed in the clothes of religion—the Muslim manosphere.

“我再也受不了了。这开始影响我的心理健康，”玛丽亚姆说。许多在互联网上引人注目的女性都曾遭受过网络骚扰。尽管其背后的厌女症如出一辙，但骚扰的形式却不计其数。玛丽亚姆所遭受的特定骚扰形式，源于“男性圈”（manosphere）中披着宗教外衣的一个分支——穆斯林男性圈。

At its core, the manosphere is built around male grievance and antifeminist ideology—though whether that’s entirely organic or engineered to sell supplements and other products is up for debate. Regardless, it has no shortage of subcultures to chose from: Incels, pick-up artists, men’s rights activists, and followers of the Red Pill.

从本质上讲，男性圈是围绕男性不满情绪和反女权主义意识形态建立的——尽管这究竟是完全自发的，还是为了推销补品和其他产品而精心设计的，尚有争议。无论如何，它不乏各种亚文化可供选择：非自愿独身者（Incels）、搭讪艺术家、男性权利活动家以及“红药丸”（Red Pill）的追随者。

Some nuances may make these groups distinct, but they largely share a common worldview: Feminism has destabilized society, women have acquired too much power, and men must reassert control. And the Muslim manosphere is no different. It’s adopted those ideas circulating through the wider manosphere and rebranded them in the language of faith.

尽管这些群体之间存在一些细微差别，但他们大体上共享着一种共同的世界观：女权主义破坏了社会稳定，女性获得了过多的权力，男性必须重新确立控制权。穆斯林男性圈也不例外。它采纳了在更广泛的男性圈中流传的那些观点，并用信仰的语言对其进行了重新包装。

Sarah Kaddoura, a feminist researcher and creator of the YouTube channel Haki Nasawi, examined the Arabic-speaking manosphere in a 2025 report. In her study, she describes some of the most prominent influencers, such as Jordanian relationship coach Kareem Atta’i, who posts online as Coach Kareem or Red Pill Arabic.

女权主义研究员、YouTube 频道“Haki Nasawi”的创作者萨拉·卡杜拉（Sarah Kaddoura）在 2025 年的一份报告中研究了阿拉伯语男性圈。在她的研究中，她描述了一些最著名的网红，例如约旦关系教练卡里姆·阿塔伊（Kareem Atta’i），他在网上以“卡里姆教练”（Coach Kareem）或“阿拉伯红药丸”（Red Pill Arabic）的名义发布内容。

Atta’i packages his ideas as relationship advice, but his videos frequently frame interactions between men and women as contests for power. Atta’i’s videos, which WIRED Middle East has watched, describe violence as a means of “disciplining” women or retaliating against sexual rejection.

阿塔伊将他的观点包装为关系建议，但他的视频经常将男女之间的互动描绘成权力争夺。据《连线》中东版（WIRED Middle East）观看过的阿塔伊视频显示，他将暴力描述为“管教”女性或报复性拒绝的一种手段。

The Arabic manosphere does more than translate Western Red Pill content. Its creators have adapted the ideology to local anxieties around religion, masculinity, marriage, money, and social change.

阿拉伯男性圈所做的不仅仅是翻译西方的“红药丸”内容。其创作者已将这种意识形态调整为适应当地对宗教、男性气质、婚姻、金钱和社会变革的焦虑。

Kaddoura says influencers use financial insecurity, political instability, religious identity, and fears about declining morality or social cohesion to build their audiences. Misogyny becomes an explanation for a much wider sense of frustration—and women become its most visible target.

卡杜拉表示，网红们利用经济不安全感、政治不稳定、宗教认同以及对道德沦丧或社会凝聚力下降的恐惧来建立受众群体。厌女症成为了一种解释更广泛挫败感的借口，而女性则成为了其最显眼的目标。

The problem is not religious expression online but the use of religious authority—real or claimed—to legitimize misogyny, harassment, and the public surveillance of women. The Muslim manosphere is also not confined to the Arab world. Like the broader manosphere, it crosses borders, languages, and platforms.

问题不在于网上的宗教表达，而在于利用宗教权威（无论真实与否）来使厌女症、骚扰和对女性的公共监视合法化。穆斯林男性圈也不局限于阿拉伯世界。像更广泛的男性圈一样，它跨越了国界、语言和平台。

Take prominent UK-based creator Ali Dawah, whose channel features street debates and commentary about relationships, gender roles, religion, and Western culture. In one clip, Dawah says he hates Muslim feminists “the most.” In another video, he approaches women in public and challenges them over clothing he describes as immodest.

以居住在英国的知名创作者阿里·达瓦（Ali Dawah）为例，他的频道以街头辩论以及关于关系、性别角色、宗教和西方文化的评论为特色。在一个片段中，达瓦说他“最”讨厌穆斯林女权主义者。在另一个视频中，他在公共场合接近女性，并就他所描述的“不检点”的服装对她们提出质疑。

“Dawah” is not just this YouTuber’s name. In Arabic, it means to make an invitation to someone to learn about Islam. Ali is just one of many influencers often called “Dawah Bros,” and they’re generally known for being more aggressive than offering an invitation when it comes to promoting their manosphere-esque content.

“Dawah”（达瓦）不仅仅是这位 YouTuber 的名字。在阿拉伯语中，它的意思是邀请某人了解伊斯兰教。阿里只是众多常被称为“达瓦兄弟”（Dawah Bros）的网红之一，他们在推广其男性圈风格的内容时，通常被认为比单纯的“邀请”更具攻击性。

Kaddoura sees the Dawah Bros as a platform-native successor to an older variety of media figure. During the 1990s, Islamic television programs in Egypt and Saudi Arabia regularly featured sheikhs answering callers’ questions about relationships, clothing, and acceptable behavior. However, unlike television preachers, today’s influencers are not limited to scheduled broadcasts, and they aren’t only interacting with people who’ve chosen to call in.

卡杜拉认为，“达瓦兄弟”是旧式媒体人物在平台原生环境下的继任者。在 20 世纪 90 年代，埃及和沙特阿拉伯的伊斯兰电视节目经常邀请谢赫（宗教领袖）回答观众关于关系、服装和可接受行为的提问。然而，与电视传教士不同，今天的网红不受预定广播时间的限制，他们也不仅仅与选择拨打电话的人互动。

For many Muslim women—especially those who are in prominent places on the internet—these ideas do not remain confined to podcasts or debate videos. They spill into comment sections and private messages, where strangers appoint themselves enforcers of morality.

对于许多穆斯林女性——尤其是那些在互联网上处于显眼位置的女性——来说，这些观点并不仅限于播客或辩论视频。它们蔓延到评论区和私人消息中，陌生人在那里自封为道德的执行者。

A 2026 report by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue analyzed nearly 14,000 comments directed at 40 prominent public figures and influencers on Instagram in Jordan over a 12-month period. Among comments classified as hate speech, harassment, or abusive language, 72 percent targeted women, 11 percent were classified as religious or moral harassment, and the vast majority of those comments—85 percent—targeted female influencers.

战略对话研究所（Institute for Strategic Dialogue）2026 年的一份报告分析了 12 个月内针对约旦 Instagram 上 40 位知名公众人物和网红的近 14,000 条评论。在被归类为仇恨言论、骚扰或辱骂性语言的评论中，72% 针对女性，11% 被归类为宗教或道德骚扰，而其中绝大多数（85%）针对的是女性网红。

Additionally, all of the comments classified as sexual harassment were directed at women, underlining the pervasive contradictions in how women are policed on the internet—the same online environment that instructing women to make themselves invisible also subjecting them to unwanted sexual attention. That contradiction is visible in the messages Mariam has received.

此外，所有被归类为性骚扰的评论都针对女性，这凸显了互联网上女性被监管方式中普遍存在的矛盾——同一个要求女性“隐身”的网络环境，同时也让她们遭受不必要的性关注。这种矛盾在玛丽亚姆收到的消息中显而易见。

The manosphere’s reach is shaped in part by the recommendation systems that determine what users encounter in their feeds. “As soon as you create an account on TikTok, YouTube, X, Instagram, and others as a male, it doesn’t take long for the algorithm to start recommending misogynistic content,” Kaddoura says. Engagement-based systems can amplify emotionally charged and polarizing content, including ma

男性圈的影响力在一定程度上是由决定用户在信息流中看到什么的推荐系统所塑造的。卡杜拉说：“一旦你以男性身份在 TikTok、YouTube、X、Instagram 等平台上创建账户，算法很快就会开始推荐厌女内容。”基于参与度的系统可以放大充满情绪和两极分化的内容，包括……