An update on independent evaluators

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An update on independent evaluators

Announcements An update on independent evaluators Oct 15, 2026

公告 关于独立评估人员的最新进展 2026年10月15日

Last month, we committed to stronger independent, third-party assessment of our models and safety practices. We also signed the White House Accord on Super Intelligence, in which companies pledged to partner with independent external auditors or evaluators. Today, we’re announcing that we’ve started to give employee-like access to a team from METR, a nonprofit that evaluates frontier AI models.

上个月，我们承诺对我们的模型和安全实践进行更强有力的独立第三方评估。我们还签署了《白宫超级智能协议》，其中各公司承诺与独立的外部审计师或评估人员合作。今天，我们宣布已开始向 METR 的团队提供类似于员工的访问权限，METR 是一家评估前沿人工智能模型的非营利组织。

METR will publish the results of its risk assessments. Over the past year, we’ve worked with METR on several reviews of our Risk Reports. We’re also working with SecureBio and Accenture as evaluators, and are in early discussions with several other organizations, including Hugging Face. Here, we explain our approach to working with evaluators.

METR 将发布其风险评估结果。在过去的一年中，我们与 METR 就我们的风险报告进行了多次审查合作。我们还与 SecureBio 和埃森哲（Accenture）作为评估方进行合作，并正在与其他几家组织（包括 Hugging Face）进行初步讨论。在此，我们解释我们与评估人员合作的方法。

Why we work with independent evaluators As models have become more powerful, they’ve required stronger safeguards and more challenging risk assessments. We want to be publicly accountable for the decisions we’re making. But we can’t publicly share all the information relevant to our safety work. Some of it could be useful to malicious actors, or is commercially sensitive, like compute or training information. Instead, we’re giving third-party evaluators deep access to our information, and are having them share evidence and reasoned conclusions about the risks involved in building our models. We aim to close the gap between what evaluators understand about a frontier AI company’s systems and what the company itself understands.

我们为何与独立评估人员合作 随着模型变得越来越强大，它们需要更强的保障措施和更具挑战性的风险评估。我们希望对所做的决策承担公开责任。但我们无法公开分享与我们安全工作相关的所有信息。其中一些信息可能对恶意行为者有用，或者具有商业敏感性，例如计算或训练信息。因此，我们正在让第三方评估人员深入访问我们的信息，并让他们分享关于构建我们模型所涉及风险的证据和合理结论。我们的目标是缩小评估人员对前沿人工智能公司系统的理解与公司自身理解之间的差距。

To evaluate frontier models, evaluators need the following: Expertise in assessing the capabilities of frontier models, including understanding the way evaluations can go wrong, such as alignment faking. Independence: they shouldn’t hold equity in the company they’re evaluating, or be financially or operationally dependent on it. Enough access to meaningfully evaluate risks. Beyond access to the latest models, evaluators also need visibility into how those models were trained, into how our safeguards function, and more. Freedom to publish observations and assessments of a model or a process.

为了评估前沿模型，评估人员需要具备以下条件： 评估前沿模型能力的专业知识，包括了解评估可能出错的方式，例如“对齐伪装”（alignment faking）。 独立性：他们不应持有被评估公司的股权，也不应在财务或运营上依赖该公司。 足够的访问权限以有意义地评估风险。除了访问最新模型外，评估人员还需要了解这些模型是如何训练的、我们的保障措施是如何运作的等等。 发布对模型或流程的观察和评估的自由。

Although the analogy isn’t exact, bank supervision operates on similar logic. Banks know more about their own risk positions than outsiders do, so regulators assign resident examiners to work inside the largest banks. If a bank’s risk-taking could threaten the public, third parties try to see that in advance.

虽然这个类比并不完全准确，但银行监管的运作逻辑与之类似。银行比外部人员更了解自身的风险状况，因此监管机构会指派驻场审查员在大型银行内部工作。如果一家银行的风险承担可能威胁到公众，第三方会尝试提前发现这一点。

For the AI industry, this is a step toward robust safety oversight. We’re moving quickly with multiple evaluators and learning actively about what kinds of partnership work. We’re committed to sharing updates as we go.

对于人工智能行业而言，这是迈向稳健安全监管的一步。我们正在与多家评估机构快速推进合作，并积极学习什么样的合作方式有效。我们承诺在推进过程中分享最新进展。

What we mean by “employee-like access” We’ve onboarded six METR employees with company hardware, office space, and access to internal tools and systems that are roughly on par with what our own risk assessment teams have access to. Outside a small number of clearly defined categories (e.g., data about customers, attorney-client privileged information, or information about our model architectures), Anthropic employees are encouraged to share information with them just as they would with a fellow employee working on alignment risk.

我们所说的“类似于员工的访问权限”是指什么 我们已经让六名 METR 员工入职，为他们提供了公司硬件、办公空间，以及与我们自己的风险评估团队大致相当的内部工具和系统访问权限。除了少数明确定义的类别（例如客户数据、律师-客户特权信息或有关我们模型架构的信息）外，我们鼓励 Anthropic 员工像对待从事对齐风险工作的同事一样与他们分享信息。

METR will publish its analysis of our risk levels, incidents, or practices. Anthropic can’t veto publication, but we can require them to redact information if it falls into narrow, predefined categories like the ones above. METR is free to characterize our redactions publicly, and say whether it believes the redactions were justified, as long as it does so without revealing the redacted information.

METR 将发布其对我们风险水平、事件或实践的分析。Anthropic 无权否决发布，但如果信息属于上述狭窄的预定义类别，我们可以要求他们进行删减。METR 可以自由地公开描述我们的删减行为，并说明其是否认为这些删减是合理的，只要它在这样做时不泄露被删减的信息即可。

Our engagement with METR is limited to a small team operating under enforceable agreements. Other METR employees are siloed from that team’s work, including researchers who work with us on other projects. Embedded evaluation gives a few qualified people working under Anthropic’s security standards a close view of how we operate. It’s not a way for other organizations to obtain our information, or that of our customers and partners.

我们与 METR 的合作仅限于在可执行协议下运作的小型团队。其他 METR 员工与该团队的工作是隔离的，包括那些与我们在其他项目上合作的研究人员。嵌入式评估让少数在 Anthropic 安全标准下工作的合格人员能够近距离观察我们的运作方式。这不是其他组织获取我们或我们客户及合作伙伴信息的一种途径。

Our other evaluator partnerships We’re working on several other partnerships. Because these other partnerships are still in early stages, we’re providing these evaluators with more limited information, and they have more limited publication rights. Our goal with these early engagements is to make sure that our partners protect confidential information and have the requisite resources and expertise to evaluate our models. As partnerships progress and we build trust, we hope to fully embed more independent evaluators.

我们与其他评估方的合作 我们正在进行其他几项合作。由于这些合作仍处于早期阶段，我们向这些评估人员提供的信息较为有限，他们的发布权利也受到更多限制。我们进行这些早期接触的目标是确保我们的合作伙伴保护机密信息，并具备评估我们模型所需的资源和专业知识。随着合作的进展和信任的建立，我们希望全面嵌入更多的独立评估人员。

We’re developing three tiers of access for evaluators. Over time, we hope to have several evaluators at the third tier, with each team publishing their own analysis of our risk posture and key decisions. In the first tier, evaluators conduct narrowly scoped risk investigations. We decide what access to provide a first-tier evaluator, and evaluators can publish their findings with our approval. In the second tier, evaluators can publish without our approval, and they have access to more information. We can still require removal of specific categories of information, though evaluators can publish their views on whether our redactions were justified. The third tier is the arrangement we’ve described with METR, with employee-like access and publication rights similar to those of the second tier.

我们正在为评估人员开发三个级别的访问权限。随着时间的推移，我们希望有几家评估机构达到第三级，每个团队都能发布他们对我们风险状况和关键决策的分析。 在第一级，评估人员进行范围狭窄的风险调查。我们决定向第一级评估人员提供什么访问权限，评估人员可以在获得我们批准的情况下发布其调查结果。 在第二级，评估人员无需我们的批准即可发布，并且他们可以访问更多信息。我们仍然可以要求删除特定类别的信息，尽管评估人员可以就我们的删减是否合理发表他们的看法。 第三级就是我们所描述的与 METR 的安排，拥有类似于员工的访问权限，以及与第二级类似的发布权利。

SecureBio is in the process of reviewing the chemical and biological weapons chapter of our August Risk Report, after completing and publishing a pilot review of our previous risk report. After this review is complete, we will consider moving to projects with increased access. With Accenture and Faculty, we’re working toward an ambitious partnership that includes evaluating and red-teaming models, conducting alignment assessments, testing model safeguards, and building capabilities across our organizations.

SecureBio 在完成并发布了对我们上一份风险报告的试点审查后，目前正在审查我们八月份风险报告中关于化学和生物武器的章节。在此次审查完成后，我们将考虑转向访问权限更高的项目。我们正在与埃森哲（Accenture）和 Faculty 努力建立一项雄心勃勃的合作伙伴关系，其中包括评估和对模型进行红队测试、进行对齐评估、测试模型保障措施以及在我们各组织间建立能力。

We’re embedding evaluators voluntarily, and we believe every frontier AI company should do the same.

我们正在自愿嵌入评估人员，我们相信每一家前沿人工智能公司都应该这样做。