A network smuggling Starlink tech into Iran to beat internet blackout

一个向伊朗走私星链技术以突破网络封锁的地下网络

“If even one extra person is able to access the internet, I think it’s successful and it’s worth it,” says Sahand. “如果能多一个人连上互联网，我认为这就是成功，也是值得的，”萨汉德（Sahand）说道。

The Iranian man is visibly anxious, speaking to the BBC outside Iran, as he carefully explains how he is part of a clandestine network smuggling satellite internet technology - which is illegal in Iran - into the country. 这位伊朗男子在伊朗境外接受BBC采访时显得忧心忡忡。他小心翼翼地解释了自己如何参与了一个地下网络，将卫星互联网技术——这在伊朗属于非法——走私到国内。

Sahand, whose name we have changed, fears for family members and other contacts inside the country. “If I was identified by the Iranian regime, they might make those I’m in touch with in Iran pay the price,” he says. 萨汉德（化名）为国内的家人和其他联系人感到担忧。他说：“如果我被伊朗政权认出来，他们可能会让我在伊朗的联系人付出代价。”

For more than two months, Iran has been in digital darkness as the government maintains one of the longest-running national internet shutdowns ever recorded worldwide. 两个多月来，伊朗一直处于数字黑暗之中，政府维持着全球有记录以来持续时间最长的全国性互联网封锁之一。

The current blackout began after the US and Israel launched airstrikes on 28 February. Before that, internet access had been partially restored for just a month following a previous digital shutdown in January, imposed during a deadly regime crackdown on nationwide protests. More than 6,500 protesters were killed and 53,000 arrested, according to the US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA). 目前的断网始于2月28日美国和以色列发动空袭之后。在此之前，1月份曾发生过一次数字封锁，当时政府对全国范围的抗议活动进行了致命镇压。据总部位于美国的“人权活动家新闻社”（HRANA）称，那次封锁后互联网接入仅恢复了一个月，期间有超过6500名抗议者被杀，5.3万人被捕。

Officials say the government shut down the internet during the war for security reasons, suggesting the aim is to prevent surveillance, espionage and cyber-attacks. 官方称，政府在战争期间出于安全原因关闭了互联网，并表示其目的是防止监视、间谍活动和网络攻击。

Without access to independent information sources, Iranians are reliant on media sources that are run by the regime or close to it. 由于无法获取独立的信息来源，伊朗人只能依赖由政权运营或与政权关系密切的媒体。

The Starlink devices Sahand sends to Iran are one of the most reliable ways of bypassing the shutdown. The white, flat terminals, paired with routers, provide internet access by connecting to a network of satellites owned by Elon Musk’s SpaceX company, allowing users to completely bypass Iran’s heavily controlled domestic internet. 萨汉德发送到伊朗的星链（Starlink）设备是绕过封锁最可靠的方法之一。这些白色的扁平终端配合路由器，通过连接埃隆·马斯克旗下SpaceX公司的卫星网络提供互联网接入，使用户能够完全绕过伊朗受到严格管控的国内互联网。

According to Sahand, several people can connect to each terminal at the same time. He says he and others in the network buy them and “smuggle them through the borders” in a “very complex operation”, though he declines to give details. 据萨汉德称，每个人终端可以同时供多人连接。他说，他和网络中的其他人通过“非常复杂的操作”购买并“将它们走私过边境”，但他拒绝透露具体细节。

Sahand says he has sent a dozen to Iran since January and “we are actively looking for other ways to smuggle in more”. 萨汉德表示，自1月份以来，他已经向伊朗发送了十几台设备，并且“我们正在积极寻找其他走私更多设备的方法”。

The human rights organisation Witness estimated in January that there are at least 50,000 Starlink terminals in Iran. Activists say the number is likely to have risen. The BBC contacted SpaceX for more details about the use of Starlink in the country but did not receive a response. 人权组织Witness在1月份估计，伊朗境内至少有5万台星链终端。活动人士称，这一数字很可能已经上升。BBC联系了SpaceX，希望了解更多关于星链在伊朗使用的情况，但未收到回复。

Last year, the Iranian government passed legislation that made using, buying or selling Starlink devices punishable by up to two years in prison. The jail term for distributing or importing more than 10 devices can be up to 10 years. 去年，伊朗政府通过立法，规定使用、购买或销售星链设备可被判处最高两年监禁。分发或进口超过10台设备，刑期最高可达10年。

State-affiliated media has reported multiple cases of people being arrested for selling and buying Starlink terminals, including four people - two of them foreign nationals - arrested last month for “importing satellite internet equipment”. It has also reported that some of the arrests include accusations of possessing illegal weapons and sending information to the enemy. 官方媒体报道了多起因买卖星链终端而被捕的案件，包括上个月因“进口卫星互联网设备”而被捕的四人（其中两人为外籍人士）。报道还称，部分逮捕行动涉及非法持有武器和向敌人发送信息的指控。

However, a market for the terminals in Iran continues, including through a public Persian-language Telegram channel called NasNet. A volunteer involved with the channel from outside Iran told the BBC that approximately 5,000 Starlink terminals have been sold through it in the past two and a half years. 然而，伊朗境内的终端市场依然存在，包括通过一个名为NasNet的公开波斯语Telegram频道。一名在伊朗境外参与该频道的志愿者告诉BBC，过去两年半里，通过该频道售出了约5000台星链终端。

Iran has a long history of controlling information, both by pushing its own anti-American and anti-Israeli narratives via state-run media and by restricting reporting about repressive measures used by the regime against its critics. 伊朗在控制信息方面有着悠久的历史，既通过官方媒体推行其反美和反以色列的叙事，也限制关于政权对批评者采取镇压措施的报道。

Yet during the January protests, even with the internet shut down, reports and video evidence of extrajudicial killings, arrests and beatings trickled out. Much of this information is known or believed by human rights organisations to have come from people accessing social media platforms via Starlink. 然而，在1月份的抗议活动中，尽管互联网被切断，有关法外处决、逮捕和殴打的报道及视频证据还是流传了出来。人权组织认为，这些信息大多来自通过星链访问社交媒体平台的人。

Iran’s current internet set-up has been described as a “tiered system”. All Iranians have access to a state-controlled domestic network on which services such as banking, ride-hailing and food delivery operate, as well as state-run media. 伊朗目前的互联网架构被描述为一种“分层系统”。所有伊朗人都可以访问受国家控制的国内网络，该网络运行着银行、网约车和外卖等服务，以及官方媒体。

Before the blackouts, Iranians were also able to access the global internet. But many sites and services such as Instagram, Telegram, YouTube and WhatsApp were blocked, and the government set higher prices for access than for the domestic network. 在断网之前，伊朗人还可以访问全球互联网。但Instagram、Telegram、YouTube和WhatsApp等许多网站和服务被屏蔽，且政府设定的访问价格高于国内网络。

Many Iranians circumvented the restrictions by using virtual private networks (VPNs), which connect users to websites via remote servers, concealing their locations. Subscriptions for these also pushed up costs. 许多伊朗人通过使用虚拟专用网络（VPN）来规避限制，VPN通过远程服务器连接网站并隐藏用户位置。这些服务的订阅费用也推高了成本。

Now, under the blackout, only a select few officials and other individuals, including journalists working for state media, have unfettered internet access using what are known as “white sim cards”. 现在，在断网状态下，只有少数官员和其他个人（包括为官方媒体工作的记者）能够使用所谓的“白卡”（white sim cards）不受限制地访问互联网。

In 2022, Musk said he was activating Starlink in Iran following severe internet disruptions during protests sparked by the death in custody of an Iranian woman, Mahsa Amini. Since then its use has grown, especially during shutdowns. 2022年，在伊朗女子玛莎·阿米尼（Mahsa Amini）在拘留期间死亡引发抗议，导致互联网严重中断后，马斯克表示他已在伊朗激活了星链。自那时起，其使用量不断增长，尤其是在断网期间。

Now, with the authorities increasingly on the hunt for Starlink terminals, Sahand and his network are advising users to use VPNs with the satellite technology in order to remain incognito. But many people cannot afford it, particularly at a time of economic crisis. 现在，随着当局对星链终端的搜查力度加大，萨汉德和他的网络建议用户在使用卫星技术时配合VPN，以保持匿名。但许多人负担不起，尤其是在经济危机时期。

Sahand is one of three people the BBC has spoken to who say they are involved in smuggling Starlink devices. He says the operation he is involved with, including the purchase of the terminals, is funded by Iranians abroad and others who want to help those in the country. 萨汉德是BBC采访的三名声称参与走私星链设备的人之一。他说，他所参与的行动（包括购买终端）是由海外伊朗人和其他希望帮助国内民众的人资助的。